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The New Hampshire primary is scheduled to take place on Tuesday, February 11, and numer-ous polls have told us and are telling us what 
the voters are contemplating “if the election were held 
today.” In interpreting what the polls mean for the 
actual primary election, however, we need to take into 
consideration several caveats. 
1. Voters are mostly undecided, even close to 
election day. 
The polls typically ask respondents how they would 
vote if the election were held immediately, and most 
poll respondents will give some name. But that 
response doesn’t mean they are committed: typically, 
leading up to the election anywhere between half and 
three quarters of voters are still trying to decide whom 
to choose. Thus, last-minute swings in support are pos-
sible and quite common. 
For example, two months before the 2012 primary, 
59 percent of Republican voters were unsure whom to 
vote for; the Sunday before 29 percent were still unsure. 
Two months before the 2016 primary, 55 percent of 
Republicans and 45 percent of Democrats were unde-
cided, and in the mid-October 2019 CNN/University of 
New Hampshire (UNH) poll 57 percent of Democrats 
were undecided. (Likely because there is not, as yet, a 
competitive Republican primary, only 28 percent of likely 
Republican primary voters were undecided, and the great 
majority said they would vote for President Trump.)
2. Even “decided” primary voters can change their 
minds at the last minute—because there are no 
party differences among candidates. 
In a general election contest, voters’ preferences are 
highly influenced by their party affiliation. Even voters 
who know little about the candidates can still rely on 
the candidate’s party as an indicator of whom to choose. 
But in a primary contest, there is no party difference 
to anchor voter preferences, and if policy differences 
are slight the voter might vote for one candidate just as 
easily as another. Thus, last-minute ads, news stories, 
and campaign activities that suddenly favor one can-
didate over another can cause a major swing in voter 
preferences in a short time. Hillary Clinton trailed 
Barack Obama by an average of 8 percentage points 
in polls finishing Sunday before the 2008 primary, but 
a good debate performance on Saturday night and 
continuing news coverage of a “humanizing” incident at 
a Portsmouth coffee shop helped her sway last-minute 
voters and pull out a surprising 2 percentage point win.
3. Pollsters’ predictions of voter turnout are fraught 
with problems that can distort results. 
Unlike most states, New Hampshire allows any resident 
of voting age to participate in the primary, even if they 
are not previously registered,1 and anywhere from 10 
to 15 percent of a New Hampshire primary electorate 
consists of people who register to vote at the polls on 
Election Day. Many pollsters use past primary voting 
lists as their source for sampling potential respondents, 
but that approach would exclude the “walk-in” voters, 
who could be demographically and politically quite 
different from the rest of the voters—thus resulting in 
misleading poll results. 
4. Final pre-election polls in the New Hampshire 
primary have often been right—but have just as 
often been wrong. 
Because of the factors mentioned above, the accuracy 
of polling in the New Hampshire primary has been 
inconsistent. In 2008, the polls did an excellent job 
predicting the Republican winner (John McCain), 
but they were all wrong predicting the Democratic 
winner (Hillary Clinton). Indeed, in every primary 
election from 1968 through 2000, the polling in New 
Hampshire differed significantly from the final results. 
The major problem is that the polls typically stop 
two to three days before the election and therefore 
don’t catch changes that occur right before people vote. 
Exit polls (taken as voters leave the voting booths) 
have consistently shown that one-third or more of New 
Hampshire voters made up their minds in the last three 
days before the election, and one in six made up their 
minds on Election Day itself. 
Given these caveats, it’s prudent to take a skeptical 
look at what the polls are showing us. They measure 
voters’ top-of-mind reactions to the candidates, but 
with no guarantee that the voters will retain those 
views as the election approaches. 
5. The impact of only one competitive primary.
Voters in New Hampshire can register as Democrats, 
Republicans, or undeclared. The 42 percent of regis-
tered voters in this last group are, unfortunately, often 
referred to by media and New Hampshire politicos as 
“independents.” Most of them are not.
In fact, when the undeclared are asked if they lean 
toward either of the two major parties, most admit they 
do, with only about 10 percent of the electorate saying 
they do not lean to either party. Research shows that 
those who lean toward a party tend to vote the same way 
as those who are registered with that party. The unde-
clared voters who do not lean to a party are the least 
likely to vote.  
With President Trump not facing a serious challenger 
so far in 2020, many in the media have wondered how 
the “independents” (or undeclared voters) might impact 
the Democratic primary. According to state laws, on 
primary election day undeclared voters can choose to 
vote in either the Republican or Democratic primary. 
(Voters registered as either Republicans or Democrats 
can choose to vote only in their party’s primary.) 
Might many undeclared voters, even those who lean 
Republican, choose to participate in the Democratic 
primary? If so, how much of an impact could these so-
called independents have on the outcome? 
The short answer is: probably not much. Over 
time, most undeclared voters tend to vote only in one 
party’s primary or another; very few choose to vote in 
a Republican primary one time and in a Democratic 
primary the next. Even though there is little competi-
tion in the GOP primary this time around, the vast 
majority of undeclared voters who lean Republican will 
either vote in their party’s primary or not vote at all. 
And most of the undeclared voters who do not lean to 
either party will not vote.
Still, research shows that a small number of primary 
voters—about 3 percent—do switch parties from one 
election to another, depending on which primary seems 
to be more competitive. In very close contests, as the 
one in 2020 appears to be (as of this writing), it is pos-
sible that the results in the Democratic primary could 
be affected by undeclared voters, some of whom might 
be Republicans. So far, in New Hampshire’s history, the 
undeclared voters have not determined the outcome in 
a primary, but pollsters need to be aware that the past is 
no guarantee of the future. They need to measure what 
undeclared voters intend to do.
6. The Iowa effect. 
One thing to keep in mind is that the Iowa caucuses 
just eight days before the New Hampshire primary can 
upend candidate standings in New Hampshire and ren-
der irrelevant any polls taken prior to the Iowa contest. 
But unfortunately for pundits, the “Iowa effect” is not 
always predictable.
For Republicans, recent history suggests the Iowa 
results have little effect on a candidate’s standing in New 
Hampshire. Such was the case for George W. Bush in 
2000, who won Iowa but lost big to John McCain in New 
Hampshire. Similarly, neither Mike Huckabee (2008), 
Rick Santorum (2012), nor Ted Cruz (2016) saw any boost 
in their New Hampshire standings after winning in Iowa. 
However, not-so-recent history provides a different 
lesson. In 1980, for example, George H.W. Bush was 
initially helped in New Hampshire by winning in Iowa, 
as was Bob Dole in 1988. In 1996, Pat Buchanan was 
helped by his second-place showing in Iowa. 
One explanation for the lack of an Iowa effect on 
New Hampshire for Republican candidates in recent 
times is that the electorates in the two states are different. 
Exit polls in 2008, 2012, and 2016, for example, showed 
that about 12 percent to 17 percent of Iowa caucus voters 
considered themselves “moderate” or “liberal,” com-
pared with 45 percent and 47 percent of New Hampshire 
primary voters in 2008 and 2012 but just 29 percent in 
2016. More importantly, the percentage of evangelical 
Republicans voting in Iowa is almost three times greater 
than in New Hampshire: 57 percent versus 22 percent in 
2012, and 64 percent versus 22 percent in 2016. 
While history gives us a mixed message about the 
effect of Iowa on New Hampshire for Republicans, a 
good showing in Iowa for Democrats typically helps 
the candidate in New Hampshire. That was the case 
for Obama in 2008, John Kerry in 2004, Richard 
Gephardt and Paul Simon in 1988, Gary Hart in 1984, 
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and Jimmy Carter in 1980 and 1976. The good show-
ings in Iowa did not always translate into victories in 
New Hampshire (for example, Obama, Gephardt, and 
Simon), but they did give the candidates a boost. 
In contrast with Republicans, the ideological profiles 
of Democratic voters in Iowa and New Hampshire are 
similar: In 2016, the last competitive cycle, exit polls 
showed Iowa with liberals outnumbering moderates/con-
servatives by 78 percent to 22 percent; in New Hampshire 
the comparable figures were 68 percent to 32 percent. 
Given these data, one could speculate that, for 
Democrats, a victory in Iowa would give the winner 
a boost in New Hampshire. Still, even that pattern 
may be upset this year because of the large amounts 
of money available to candidates and because of the 
unusually large number of candidates. The screening 
process could be much slower this year, with well-
funded candidates able to continue their campaigns 
even if they lose in several of the early contests. 
As for current polls predicting the winners in New 
Hampshire, history suggests considerable caution. As 
Yogi Berra might remind us if he were a cable news 
commentator, “It ain’t over till it’s over.”
The Carsey Perspectives series gives authors the opportunity to 
present their analysis of important topics that is not based on 
original data analysis.
About the Authors
David Moore is the founding director of the UNH 
Survey Center and a Carsey fellow. Andrew Smith 
directs the Survey Center at the University of New 
Hampshire and is a professor of 
practice in political science at the 
University of New Hampshire. 
They are coauthors of the 
book, The First Primary: New 
Hampshire’s Outsize Role in 
Presidential Nominations.
  3 C A R S E Y  S C H O O L  O F  P U B L I C  P O L I C Y
 
The Carsey School of Public Policy at the University of New Hampshire is a nationally acclaimed resource for research, leadership 
development, and engaged scholarship relevant to public policy. We address the most pressing challenges of the twenty-first century,
striving for innovative, responsive, and equitable solutions at all levels of government and in the for-profit and nonprofit sectors.
Huddleston Hall • 73 Main Street • Durham, NH 03824
(603) 862-2821
TTY Users: dial 7-1-1 or 1-800-735-2964 (Relay N.H.)
carsey.unh.edu
University of New Hampshire
Carsey School of Public Policy
